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Foreword to proceeding IHL
István Hahn (1913–1984) was former head of
the  Department  of  Ancient  History  at  ELTE
(1963–1983),  full  member  of  the  Hungarian
Academy  of  Sciences,  and  an  internationally
acknowledged expert of several areas of ancient
history.  He  graduated  from  our  university  in
1935 as a teacher of Latin, ancient Greek, and
history, whereas in 1937 he received a degree in
the College of Rabbinical Studies. Besides clas-
sical languages, he was perfect in Hebrew, Ara-
maic,  Syrian,  and  Arabic,  and  he  became  a
scholar not only of Greek and Roman political,
economic and religious history but also of the
ancient and medieval history of the Jews.
His  twenty  years  as  head  of  our  Depart-
ment laid down the course of its later history
and turned it into an internationally acclaimed
research centre. To commemorate his scientific
accomplishment,  the  Department  of  Ancient
History  at  ELTE and the Non Omnis  Moriar
Foundation decided to honour a scholar gaining
international fame in any of the scientific areas
studied  by  István  Hahn  with  the  title  István
Hahn  Lecturer in  every  second  year  (even
years). The honoured scholar holds an inaugural
lecture in our Department and publishes the lec-
ture as a small monograph in the István Hahn
Lecturers (IHL) series.
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Likewise in every two years (odd years), we
honour promising scientists less than 45 years
old with  the reward  István Hahn Prize of the
Non Omnis Moriar Foundation, which can be
freely spent on their research, though they are
also expected to publish their results in separate
volumes of the IHL.
Prof. Dr. György Németh
Head of Department
Professors honoured with the title
István Hahn Lecturer:
2008: Thomas Köves-Zulauf (Marburg)
2010: Ioan Piso (Cluj-Napoca)
2012: Heikki Solin (Helsinki)
2013: Gideon Bohak (Tel Aviv)
2015: Richard Gordon (Erfurt)
2017: Roger Tomlin (Oxford)
2019: Christopher A. Faraone (Chicago)
Promising scholars rewarded
with the István Hahn Prize:
2005: Péter Prohászka (Budapest)
2007: Ádám Szabó (Budapest)
2009: Zsolt Simon (Budapest)
2011: Levente Takács (Debrecen)
2014: Imre Áron Illés (Szeged)
2016: Dániel Bajnok (Eger)
2018: Gyula Lindner (Pécs)
8
1. Introduction
The  title  of  this  booklet  was  inspired  by  an
article in the Classical Philology by Matthew R.
Christ,  which  highlighted  “Demosthenes’  ap-
propriation  of  philanthrōpia  as  a  democratic
virtue.” As diachronic analysis revealed, φιλαν-
θρωπία had originally been a term mainly used
in philosophical and theological contexts, and it
was applied to divinities doing favours to man-
kind or to certain individuals (φίλος, ἄνθρω-
πος),  and  later,  mostly  in  historical  and
rhetorical  sources,  to  rulers  and  aristocrats
showing  a  generous  and  friendly  attitude  to-
wards people.  Christ  clearly  demonstrated the
democratization of the concept of φιλανθρω-
πία, i.e. Demosthenes’ conscious and consistent
efforts to turn the traditional, aristocratic, and
relatively rarely used notion into an important
value-term  of  contemporary  democratic  dis-
course and an attribute of the demos: “Demos-
thenes is consciously appropriating as a demo-
cratic  virtue  a  positive  attribute  that  conser-
vatives associated with elite individuals.” As a
palpable consequence,  Demosthenes ceased to
call rulers (e.g. Philip II of Macedon) a φιλάν-
θρωπος person, unless satirically.1
1 All citations in this paragraph are from Christ 2013,
205–207. For an exhaustive evolutionary analysis of the
term φιλανθρωπία, see Sulek 2010.
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No matter  how thorough his  investigation
of Demosthenes’  political  theory,  Christ  over-
looked an important passage of Aeschines, the
main political opponent of Demosthenes in the
340s  and  330s  BC.  This  text  indicates  that
Aeschines was fully aware of Demosthenes’ en-
deavour to monopolize certain elements of lan-
guage, φιλανθρωπία among others, in order to
achieve political success. In the concluding sec-
tion of his speech Against Ctesiphon (330 BC),
Aeschines tried to predict the consequences of
honouring Demosthenes with  a golden crown,
explaining to the Athenian audience that in this
case other Greeks shall judge their city on the
basis of the repulsive and cowardly behaviour of
Demosthenes. At this point, after posing a rhe-
torical question, Aeschines revealed his aware-
ness of his rival’s appropriation of language:
How, then, could this disgrace be avoided? If
you are suspicious of people  who appropri-
ate for themselves the language of equality
and generosity but  whose  character  is  sus-
pect. The terms ‘‘loyalty’’ and ‘‘commitment to
democracy’’ are open to all, but in general the
people who are quickest to resort to them in
argument are the ones furthest removed from
them in their conduct.2
2 Aeschn. 3.247–248: Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις τὴν τοιαύτην
αἰσχύνην ἐκφύγοι;  ἐὰν  τοὺς προκαταλαμβάνοντας
τὰ κοινὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀπίστους
ὄντας τοῖς ἤθεσι,  φυλάξησθε. Ἡ γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ τὸ
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As  we  can  see,  Aeschines  claimed  that  his
opponent  intended  to  preoccupy  (προκατα-
λαμβάνειν) phrases that are κοινός and φιλάν-
θρωπος, but terms like εὔνοια or the name of
democracy  cannot  be  used  exclusively,  and
those  who reiterate  them in  their  speech  (τῷ
λόγῳ) are in fact far away from the values)  are  in  fact  far  away  from  the  values
conveyed by these words in their actions (τοῖς
ἔργοις).3 Aeschines  suggested  that  the  incli-
nation  to  appropriate  certain  phrases  is  yet
another character flaw of Demosthenes, imply-
ing that  Aeschines  himself  was free from the
same  weakness.  Abstract  terms  used  in  a
particular sense have long been identified and
studied  in  the speeches of  Demosthenes,4 but
relatively  little  effort  has  been made either  to
reveal  the  value  terminology  and  slogans  that
were  used  by  Aeschines  to  bolster  his  own
political  aims,  or  to  investigate  the  means  he
τῆς δημοκρατίας ὄνομα κεῖται μὲν ἐν μέσῳ) are in fact far away from the values, φθάνουσι
δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὰ καταφεύγοντες τῷ λόγῳ) are in fact far away from the values ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οἱ
τοῖς ἔργοις πλεῖστον ἀπέχοντες. Texts from Aeschines
are cited in the translation of Christopher  Carey (with
modifications, if necessary), see Carey 2000. The Greek
text  is  from  Dilts  1997.  Greek  authors,  works,  and
various  sources  are  abbreviated  according  to  The  Brill
Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Montanari 2015, x–lv).
3 Aeschines’ remonstrance against the appropriation by
Demosthenes was highlighted also by Cook 2009, 39.
4 The literature on abstract terms used by Demosthenes
is vast, for a general overview see e.g. the commentaries
on the Kranzrede (Demosth. 18) by Wankel 1976 and by
Yunis 2001.
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utilized  rhetorical  metaphors  in  an attempt  to
frame5 his  opponent  as a repulsive politician.6
What are the phrases in the lexicon of Aeschi-
nes  that  he  applied  to  establish  a  moral  and
political agenda for Athens and how does he set
his adversaries in context of these values? Did
he ever attempt to monopolize such value-terms
in the way Demosthenes did with e.g.  φιλαν-
θρωπία? What was the reaction of Demosthe-
nes, if any? This study intends to find answers
to these questions.
5 Framing “is the process whereby communicators act –
consciously  or  not  –  to  construct  a  particular  point  of
view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be
viewed  in  a  particular  manner,  with  some facts  made
more  or  less  noticeable  (even  ignored)  than  others.”
(Kuypers  2009,  182.)  Effective  rhetorical  frames  are
usually  invoked  through  metaphoric  language,  a  field
studied  by  cognitive  linguistics,  see  Lakoff–Johnson
2003,  Kövecses  2006.  For  a  concise  overview  of  the
topic, see Müller 2008, 2–14.
6 For  a  remarkable  and  thought-provoking  exception,
see Cook 2012, esp. 230–238.
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2. Research methods
Concerning  research  methodology,  the  value-
terms  investigated  in  this  study  are  greatly
specified by quantitative means. Modern com-
puter  databases  enable  researchers  to  select
various  corpora,  to  determine  their  size,  to
search them, or to compare and contrast them
according to specific criteria. If we consider the
political oeuvre of Aeschines, we can take his
three surviving orations into account (Aeschn.
1–3), which form a perfectly definable body of
texts.7 This  selection  of  texts  is  in  strong
interaction with the corpus of Demosth. 18–19.
The  content  relationship  of  the  collections  is
obvious. Demosthenes and Aeschines first con-
fronted each other in the trial against Timarchus
in 346/5, and a considerable part of Aeschines’
indictment (Aeschn. 1) is targeted on Demos-
thenes,  who  supported  the  main  defendant,
though his speech did not survive.8 The other
speeches  mentioned  are  the  main  orations
delivered  against  each  other  in  the  great
courtroom  trials  on  the  Embassy  (343,
Demosth. 19 vs.  Aeschn. 2) and on the Crown
(330, Aeschn. 3 vs. Demosth. 18). These are all
available in the database of the  Perseus Digital
7 There  are  twelve  letters  of  Aeschines  in  the
manuscript  tradition,  but  they  are  all  agreed  to  be
spurious, see Ruiz–Muñoz 2012.
8 Fisher 2001, 23–24.
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Library (hence: Perseus) and in the  Thesaurus
Linguae Graecae (TLG).9
2.1. CALIBRATING CORPORA
The selected corpora of public speeches, how-
ever,  are  not  instantly  ready  for  relevant
frequency  analysis,  since  they  may  contain
various documents: citations of laws or decrees,
excerpts  from  poetry,  letters,  witness  testi-
monies, etc. The first principal issue with these
documents is that they were not written by the
orator. This is not necessarily a serious problem
if  the  documents  serve  as  genuine  tools  of
persuasion embedded into the speech according
to  the  author’s  intention.  For  example,  if  the
orator decided to cite a piece of poetry in order
to support his arguments (as e.g. Aeschn. 1.148
or  Demosth. 19.255),  then  the  lexical  and
semantic  elements  of  the  quotation  are  valid
components of the Aeschinean or Demosthenic
corpus  that  we are  to  study,  even  though the
original author of the passages (Homer, Solon,
etc.)  is  different  from  the  speaker.  The  real
problem  emerges  if  the  documents  are  later
forgeries  added  to  the  texts.  In  the  case  of
Demosthenes,  his  speech  on  the  Embassy
contains numerous references to laws, decrees,
testimonies,  and  letters  that  were  read out  by
9 Perseus is available at  http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/.
The TLG version used for this research was CD ROM
#E, and the search engine was Diogenes by Peter Heslin.
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the γραμματεύς of the court at the request of
the  speaker.10 However,  the  surviving  text  of
Demosth. 19 does not include the actual laws,
decrees, etc., because these were probably not
copied  into  the  published  version  of  Demos-
thenes’  oration.  The  situation  is  entirely  dif-
ferent with Demosth. 18, where we find a lot of
actual  documentary  evidence,  but  all  of  them
are  considered  spurious.11 In  the  case  of
Aeschines, we can discover ample references to
documents  read out  during the trial,  but  only
the  speech  against  Timarchus  contains  actual
texts  of  documents  (until  chapter  68),  and  it
was  easy  to  disprove  their  authenticity.12
Drawing these  forgeries  into  our  investigation
would tamper the results not only in the exact
size of the corpora,  but also in the frequency
analysis of terms.
Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  calibrate  our
results by discarding all textual elements from
the collections that are not genuine constituents
of the orations. Since this is not a feature either
in Perseus or in TLG (Diogenes),  we need to
remove  spurious  documents,  reference  words
like νόμος, ψήφισμα, μαρτυρία, etc., and even
chapter  numbers  manually  from the  selection.
This will modify the size of the clusters signifi-
cantly,  however,  the  resulting  calibrated  data
10 [Aristot.] Ath. 67.3.
11 Canevaro 2013, 237–239.
12 Drerup 1898, 305–308, Fisher 2001, 68.
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reflects the true characteristics of the author’s
text  that  is  free from external  and subsequent
layers.  The  following  table  shows  the  size  of
each  relevant  collection  according  to  The
Perseus Catalog and also the size determined on
the basis of the above described calibration.
Corpus Word count(Perseus)13
Word count
(calibrated)
Aeschn. 1 13 961 13 102
Aeschn. 2 12 758 12 332
Aeschn. 3 19 171 18 488
Aeschn. 1–3 
(=ΣAesch)ΣAesch)Aesch) 45 890 43 922
Demosth. 18 22 893 19 572
Demosth. 19 23 576 23 134
Demosth. 18–19 
(=ΣAesch)ΣAesch)Dem) 46 469 42 706
Table 1. Word count of corpora.
As we can see, the difference in the number of
words between raw data and calibrated results
in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.
The same difference in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch is 1968 words
(4.5%),  which is  due to  a smaller  number of
13 For the word count of Aeschines’ speeches according
to  The  Perseus  Catalog,  see  http://catalog.perseus.org/
catalog/urn:cite:perseus:author.31; for Demosthenes,  see
http://catalog.perseus.org/catalog/urn:cite:perseus:author.
466. 
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spurious documents embedded into the text of
Aeschines. By the same token, the size of the
calibrated  Aeschinean  corpus  differs  only
slightly (2.8%) from the size of the two Demos-
thenic  orations  delivered  against  Aeschines
(Demosth.  18–19),  therefore  it  seems  reason-
able to compare the frequency of terms in Aes-
chines’ language to that of Demosthenes.
More importantly, using calibrated corpora
exonerates the research from some difficult or
even ultimately insoluble questions.  What was
the actual length of public trials at Athens? Is
there any difference between the text we have
and the text of the speech actually performed at
court? Were there any major revisions, or only
tiny emendations to oratorical texts? When and
how did  orators  publish  their  speeches,  if  at
all?14 These  intriguing  problems  become irre-
levant if  we analyse terminology in calibrated
corpora. The surviving text that we have may be
neither  historically accurate nor identical  with
the performed variant, but it will be a truthful
reflection  of  the  speaker’s  political  aims  and
terminology, or in other words, “the underlying
significance of his predicament.”15
14 For  the  problem of revision before  publication,  see
the  radical  views  of  Worthington  1991,  and  a  more
sceptical  stance  of  Harris  1995,  9–11 (for  Aeschines),
and MacDowell 2009, 7–8 (for Demosthenes).
15 Hubbard 2008, 187.
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2.2. FREQUENCY OF TERMS
Perseus also provides us with exact figures based
on the extant works of other orators in classical
Athens.  Since  ancient  literary  criticism estab-
lished  the  canon  of  the  Ten  Attic  Orators
(including Aeschines),16 it is useful to correlate
the frequency of selected terms in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch or in
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem with the frequency of the same term in
the entire corpus of orators in order that we can
see if a given phrase is used more or less often
than others. As frequency of terms is measured
on the basis of word count, we need to summa-
rize the words of orators, which makes (accord-
ing  to  the  Perseus  Greek  Vocabulary  Tool)
altogether 637004 words.17 This word count is
based  on  all  surviving  speeches  of  orators
(Aeschines,  Andocides,  Antiphon,  Demos-
thenes,18 Dinarchus,  Hyperides,19 Isaeus,  Iso-
crates,  Lycurgus,  Lysias),  including the letters
16 For the composition of the canon of the Ten Attic
Orators, see Roisman–Worthington 2015, 6–10.
17 Total word count of orators is generated by selecting
every corpus of individual orators at Greek Vocabulary
Tool (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/vocablist).
18 The  Corpus  Demosthenicum  obviously  includes
works of other authors as well, e.g. Apollodorus.
19 As  for  the  new  fragments  of  Hyperides’  Against
Diondas  and  Against  Timandrus  (320  lines,  i.e.  about
2400  words),  these  texts  have  not  been  imported  by
Perseus,  and  obviously  TLG  CD  ROM  #E  does  not
contain these, either; therefore they were not taken into
consideration.  For  the  new  Hyperides  fragments,  see
Horváth 2014.
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of  Isocrates,  and  the prologues and  letters  of
Demosthenes.
Aeschn. 1
Aeschn. 2
Aeschn. 3
ΣAesch
Dem
. 19
Dem
. 18
ΣDem
φιλανθρωπία 1 4 0 5 2 5 7
φιλάνθρωπος 1 1 2 4 7 3 10
φιλανθρωπεύομαι 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 2 5 2 9 10 8 18
Table  2.  The  frequency  of  φιλανθρωπία  and  its
cognates.
Establishing  the  size  of  three  basic  corpora
(ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  [calibrated],  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem [calibrated],  and
the total collection of Attic orators) enables us
to determine the absolute frequency of any term
within the selection simply by dividing the word
count of the relevant corpus by the number of
occurrences of the investigated term.20 E.g. the
absolute frequency of the above mentioned φιλ-
ανθρωπία  and  its  cognates21 in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  is
4880, because these phrases occur 9 times in
20 This  is  called  relative  frequency  by  the  Perseus
Vocabulary  Tool  Help  (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
hopper/  help/  vocab  ), which interpretation is not followed
here.
21 Including all inflected nominal, verbal, adjectival and
adverbial  forms  of  the  term,  with  comparatives  and
superlatives.
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43922 words. The same group of words occurs
more often in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem (18 times), thus the fre-
quency of φιλανθρωπία and cognates in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem
is 2373 (42706÷18).  The smaller  the number
indicating  absolute  frequency,  the  more  often
the term is used. Consequently, we can clearly
see that Demosthenes mentions φιλανθρωπία
more than twice as often as Aeschines.  How-
ever, since ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch and ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem, as we have seen,
are  roughly  equivalent  in  size,  the  above dis-
cussed absolute frequency index does not reveal
much further information about the use of the
term.
Still,  by the same means we can establish
the frequency of phrases in the comprehensive
collection of Attic orators.  We need to divide
the number of all  words in the corpus by the
number of times a given word occurs in it. E.g.
the  search  for  all  possible  inflected  forms  of
φιλανθρωπία and its  cognates  yields  101 re-
sults,  i.e.  the absolute frequency index of this
phrase  is  6307,  which  means  that  in  average
one  in  6307 words  belongs  to  the  mentioned
phrase.  This ratio  indicates  a  lower frequency
than  what  we  attested  in  either  of  our  two
orators’ works.
At this point we can gain more interesting
results, if we quantify the relative frequency of
Aeschines’  use  of  a  phrase  compared  to  the
number of occurrences in all other orators com-
bined, including Demosthenes. The same way,
we  can  determine  the  relative  frequency  in
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Demosthenes, too. What we need is the relative
frequency index (RFI): the quotient of a term’s
absolute frequency in Aeschines (or in Demos-
thenes) and its absolute frequency in the corpus
of other orators. If we return to the mentioned
example of φιλανθρωπία, the rounded RFI of
the  phrase  in  Aeschines  is  1.3,  which  is  the
ratio of 4880 (absolute frequency in Aeschines)
and of 6447 (absolute frequency in all orators
except Aechines). Based on the same algorithm,
RFI of  the  same  phrase  in  Demosthenes  is
almost precisely 3 (7160÷2373).
φιλανθρωπία
and cognates Occurrence
Total word 
count
Absolute 
frequency
All orators 101 637 004 6 307
Orators except
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch 92 593 083 6 447
Orators except
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem 83 594 298 7 160
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch 9 43 922 4 880
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem 18 42 706 2 373
RFI in ΣAesch (6447÷4880) 1.3
RFI in ΣDem (7160÷2373) 3
Table 3. Calculating relative frequency index (RFI) for
φιλανθρωπία and cognates
RFI can show if Aeschines applied a term (or
group  of  terms)  more  often  than  all  other
orators  or  not.  If  RFI is  1,  it  indicates  equal
21
frequency in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch and in  the collection  of
orators except ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch. If  RFI is above 1, the
phrase is mentioned more often by Aeschines;
if it is below 1, then Aeschines turned to this
phrase  less  frequently  than  other  orators  in
average.  If  RFI reaches  2,  it  signifies  double
frequency, which is already remarkable. On the
other  hand,  Demosthenes’  RFI for  φιλαν-
θρωπία  (3)  provides  excellent  quantitative
evidence  for  its  significance  in  his  political
oratory,  and  it  also  corroborates  M.  Christ’s
views on the advancement of φιλανθρωπία as
a democratic virtue in the lexicon of Demos-
thenes.  Although  Aeschines  did  not  avoid
φιλανθρωπία (in fact he used it slightly more
often than the average of other Attic orators),
he  was  clearly  not  capable  of  following  his
opponent  in  the  sustained  and  consistently
unique application of this term.
Nevertheless, examining the RFI of various
phrases in the corpus of Aeschines helps us to
find  the  key  terms  of  Aeschinean  oratory.
Calculating  RFI cannot  be  completely  auto-
mated  because  of  the  morphological  charac-
teristics  of  the  Greek  language:  some  words
have complex morphologies, and they may even
have  forms  that  are  formally  identical  with
other words, although their meaning is partly or
entirely  different.  E.g.  the abstract  noun τύχη
has  the  dative  singular  τύχῃ,  which coincides
with the aorist subjunctive of the verb τυγχάνω
22
in  third  person  singular.22 Thus,  if  we are  to
determine the precise RFI of the noun τύχη in
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch, we need to consider all  dubious pas-
sages in order to exclude incorrect data from the
research.  As  for  now,  Perseus  and  TLG
(Diogenes) are not able to decide what dictio-
nary headword or meaning is the correct one in
similar  cases,  thus  human  control-check  is
essential in every instance.
2.3. DEFINING KEY TERMS
The  Greek  Vocabulary  Tool  of  Perseus  can
easily list all dictionary entries within a corpus
(in our case, ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch), and each entry is given a
Key Term Score. As the description claims:
[W]ords with a high key term score appear
relatively often in your selection of documents
and relatively infrequently in the collection as
a whole. Words with a high key-term score
are an automatically extracted variety of key-
word  that  provides  an  initial  guide  to  im-
portant people, places, and concepts in your
selection.23
The vocabulary  list  of  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  contains  4633
unique words,  but sorting them by Key Term
22 The search for τύχῃ in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch yields three results,
two  of  them  deriving  from  τυγχάνω  (Aeschn.  1.133,
2.9), and one from τύχη (Aeschn. 3.154).
23 See http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/help/vocab. 
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Score does not instantly provide us with a useful
set  of valuable Aeschinean keywords,  because
the  catalogue  lists  numerous  cognates  as
separate  items  (e.g.  nine  out  of  the  ten  first
items on the vocabulary list sorted by Key Term
Score  are  relatives  of  the  πρεσβ-  root),  and
because even identical elements appear several
times,  since the dictionary gives them various
definitions (e.g. οὐ is listed 18 times within the
first  30  elements!).  All  in  all,  Perseus’  Key
Term Score list is not a reliable source of actual
keywords in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch, but it  is suitable to give
the reader of Aeschines a vague impression of
what terms (or groups of terms) might be more
important for the orator than others.
Still,  relying both on the Key Term Score
list and on what we might call general intuition
(based  on  extensive  readings  of  and  on  Aes-
chines),  we  composed  a  selection  of  twenty
items  including  individual  terms  and  also
groups of cognates, which were all brought into
investigation of  frequency analysis  in  order to
quantify their preponderance in the oratory of
Aeschines. (See Table 4 below). Each of them
is a content word that occurs at least 19 times in
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  (though  most  of  them  appear  much
more often), with a minimum RFI of 1.5.
Simultaneously, the very same words were
control-checked in the corresponding speeches
of  Demosthenes  (ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem),  since  the  genuine
importance  of  a  phrase  in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  can  be
highlighted after contrasting it with the use of
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the term in the orations of the opponent. The
true  dominance  in  the  use  of  a  phrase  by
Aeschines  is  indicated  by  three  factors:  1)  a
great  number  of  occurrences  (i.e.  absolute
frequency),  2)  salient  relative frequency  (RFI)
of the term, and 3) low RFI of the term on the
side of Demosthenes. If all these conditions are
met, then a specific phrase can be considered a
prevalent key concept in the political commu-
nication  of  Aeschines,  because  Demosthenes
consciously or incidentally ceded the ground in
the  the  application  of  the  given  term  to  his
adversary. A good example of these dominant
key  concepts  is  νομοθέτης  and  its  verbal
cognate νομοθετέω, which occur altogether 44
times in the indictments of Aeschines. Since the
entire collection of Attic orators contains only
167 references to the term, its RFI in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch is
4.8, which means that more than one in every
four references to the νομοθετ- root is found in
the speeches of Aeschines. On the other hand,
Demosthenes did not utter this word at all in his
speeches against Aeschines, thus the concept of
νομοθεσία was used exclusively by Aeschines
in their political debate.
In  some  cases,  however,  the  condition
described  above  in  the  third  factor  is  not
fulfilled, because the phrase was often used by
both orators (i.e. high RFI value in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch and
in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem).  This  means  that  the  concept  was
important  for  both  either  because  it  was  a
common topic that they intended to exhibit in
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their  own  ways  (as  e.g.  the  word  groups  of
πρέσβυς  or  εἰρήνη),  or  because  neither  of
them  was  willing  to  surrender  and  let  his
opponent to appropriate the term (e.g. δῶρον
and  cognates,  mutually  applied  against  each
other in the indictments and rather neglected in
the defence speeches). In any case, these words
are key concepts to Aeschines and Demosthenes
alike.
Finally,  the  set  of  Aeschinean  key  words
are supplemented by the frequency data of four
elements  that  are  well-known  Demosthenic
concepts:  εὔνοια,  πατρίς,  τύχη  and  φιλαν-
θρωπία.24 He applied each of them skilfully in
his  speeches  against  Aeschines,  who failed  to
neutralize  them,  although  he  may  have  been
aware  of  Demosthenes’  techniques,  as  it  was
pointed  out  concerning  φιλανθρωπία  in  the
Introduction.  As for  εὔνοια,  we can add that
Aeschines  may  have  consciously  avoided  the
term  in  his  last  speech,  which  is  especially
telling in light of the fact that εὔνοια was most
probably mentioned in Ctesiphon’s motion for
crowning Demosthenes in 336.25 Had Aeschines
24 For  εὔνοια,  see  especially  Muñoz  1989  and  Cook
2009; for πατρίς, see Nielsen 2004, 70–74 and  Liddel
2007, 139–140; for τύχη (combined with καιρός, also
used  by  Hyperides),  see  Wankel  1976,  908–910  and
976–977, Todd 2009, 169–171, and Horváth 2014, 105–
114. For φιλανθρωπία, see Introduction.
25 Cook  2009,  40.  For  the  use  of  this  term  in
contemporary inscriptions, see Whitehead 1993, 52–54,
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believed that he could successfully discredit his
enemy by claiming himself εὔνους (or Demos-
thenes lacking εὔνοια), he would have certainly
used this word more frequently.26 (He did not,
as  we  can  see  in  Table  4.)  In  his  defence
oration,  however,  Demosthenes  put  great  em-
phasis  on  his  civic  loyalty  (εὔνοια)  towards
Athens,  showing  its  manifestations  both  in
deeds and words, and he successfully replaced
the  cowardly  deserter  frame  that  Aeschines
tried to force on him with the image of himself
as a steadfast and loyal citizen.27
All  key  concepts  listed  in  Table  4  are
considered  here  as  value-terms,  i.e.  represen-
tatives of certain ideals either in the private or
in the public  life of Athenian citizens.  In  the
following chapter, we take a closer look at one
of the key concepts of Aeschines, decency, to
understand how the orator used it in an attempt
to  gain  an  upper  hand  over  his  opponents,
Timarchus and Demosthenes.
Veligianni-Terzi  1997,  200–202,  256–262,  274–277,
295, 304.
26 “Aeschines  finds  the  term  [εὔνοια]  tainted  and  so
hopelessly connected with Demosthenes that he refuses to
use  the  word  and rejects  its  new semantic  function  of
‘civic  loyalty’  and  its  resulting  socio-political  power.”
(Cook 2009, 38.)
27 Cook 2012, esp. 249–250, and see below chapter 4.1.
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Key terms Aeschines Demosthenes
1 2 3 ΣAesch RFI 19 18 ΣDem RFI
ἀνδρεία (cognates) 18 16 46 80 1.5 15 17 32 0.6
βῆμα 10 5 15 30 11.6 2 4 6 1.4
δειλία (cognates) 5 6 15 26 5.4 4 2 6 1
δημοκρατία (cognates) 6 6 26 38 3.2 0 1 1 0.07
δημός(ιος) 27 60 122 209 3 41 23 64 0.8
δῶρον (cognates) 5 6 42 53 2 47 12 59 2.3
εἰρήνη (cognates) 1 57 35 93 3.1 94 32 126 4.8
ἐκκλησία(ζω) 13 22 37 72 8 13 6 19 1.5
ἐλευθερία (cognates) 24 8 10 42 1.5 6 15 21 0.7
καιρός 3 15 36 54 2.3 15 22 37 1.5
κόσμιος (cognates) 12 1 6 19 2.7 2 2 4 0.5
μετριότης (cognates) 10 2 10 22 2.1 3 8 11 1
νόμος 76 10 107 193 1.5 22 36 58 0.4
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Key terms Aeschines Demosthenes
1 2 3 ΣAesch RFI 19 18 ΣDem RFI
νομοθέτης (cognates) 22 0 22 44 4.8 0 0 0 0
παιδεία (cognates) 11 3 14 28 3.6 0 2 2 0.2
παρανομέω (cognates) 3 3 40 46 3.5 0 5 5 0.3
πόρνος (cognates) 25 1 2 28 14.5 5 0 5 1.4
πρέσβυς (cognates) 9 144 52 205 11.8 124 31 155 7.6
ῥήτωρ (cognates) 13 5 22 40 2.4 2 17 19 1.1
σωφροσύνη (cognates) 28 5 11 44 3.2 3 5 8 0.5
εὔνοια (cognates) 4 8 6 18 0.9 4 36 40 2.1
πατρίς 2 6 5 13 0.5 6 35 41 2
τύχη 0 5 4 9 0.6 3 30 33 2.5
φιλανθρωπία (cognates) 2 5 2 9 1.3 10 8 18 3
Table 4. A frequency analysis of some key terms in ΣAesch)Aesch and ΣAesch)Dem.
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3. Value-terms concerning decency
The  principal  value-terms  of  Aeschines  con-
cerning  decent  behaviour  are  σωφροσύνη,28
μετριότης,29 κόσμιος,30 and  (paradoxically)
πόρνος.31 These  are  all  frequently  and  effec-
tively wielded against Timarchus in Aeschn. 1,
but their application in the subsequent orations
is also detectable and significant.
The most prevalent of all phrases referring
to decency is undoubtedly σωφροσύνη (RFI in
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch: 3.2), coined from σῶς + φρήν, with a
basic meaning ‘soundness in mind’.32 The term
and  its  cognates  display  an  abundance  of
semantic  shades from Homer and  the  archaic
28 Cognates:  σωφρονέω,  σωφρόνως,  σωφροσύνη,
σώφρων, τὸ σῶφρον. Occurrences (44): Aeschn. 1.3, 6,
7, 9, 11, 20, 22, 25, 48, 121, 122, 123, 133, 137, 139
(3x), 140, 141, 151 (2x), 156, 158, 159, 180, 181, 182,
189, 2.4, 151, 176, 180, 184, 3.2, 4, 117, 168, 170, 197,
234, 239, 242, 249, 257.
29 Cognates: μέτριος, μετριότης, μετρίως. Occurrences
(22): Aeschn. 1.1, 3, 39, 42, 51 (2x), 70, 103, 162, 174,
2.173, 181, 3.1, 9, 11 (2x), 57, 61, 129, 133, 170, 218.
30 Cognates: ἀκοσμία, εὐκοσμία, κοσμέω, κοσμητήρ,
κόσμιος,  κόσμος.  Occurrences  (19):  Aeschn.  1.8,  22
(2x), 34, 67, 169, 183 (4x), 189, 192, 2.108, 3.2, 4, 154,
185 (2x), 257.
31 Cognates:  πορνεία,  πορνεῖον,  πορνεύω,  πόρνη,
πορνικός,  πορνοβοσκός,  πόρνος.  Occurrences  (28):
Aeschn. 1.29, 52, 70, 79, 94 (2x), 119 (2x), 120, 123,
124 (4x), 130, 136, 137, 154, 155, 157, 159, 188, 189,
2.144, 3.214, 246.
32 For etymology, see Beekes 2010, 1441.
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poetry  until  the  language  of  playwrights  and
prose writers in classical Athens.33 A common
element  in  meaning  is  a  kind  of  self-control,
prudence, or common sense, which can manifest
itself  in various forms, whether intellectual  or
moral.34
A regular use of the abstract term σωφρο-
σύνη in a moral  sense is  first  attested in late
archaic  funerary  inscriptions,  as  e.g.  in  the
epitaph of Anaxilas of Naxos, a resident alien in
Athens, “whom the Athenians honoured for his
outstanding σωφροσύνη and valour.” (ὃν τίεσ-
κον  Ἀθεναῖοι  μετέοικον  /  ἔχσοχα  σοφρο-
σύνες  ἕνεκεν  ἐδ’  ἀρετε͂ς.  IG  I3 1357,  dated
510–500 BC.) Later on the phrase is frequently
found  in  funerary  context,35 but  interestingly,
the term did not become an all-purpose cardinal
virtue  of  the  Athenians,  since  it  was  mostly
applied  to  praising  those  of  whom  special
moderation and obedience was expected, espe-
cially in moral issues: women, young men, and
33 Not to mention the rich post-classical, imperial, and
patristic use of the term, see North 1966.
34 The  intellectual  and  moral  content  of  the  concept
never separated sharply: “ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.ωφροσύνη est santé d’esprit,
soit  intellectuelle,  soit  éthique.  Bien  que  ces  deux
moments  divergent,  ils  ne  sont  pas  séparés  dans  la
conscience grecque.” (Vries 1943, 99.)
35 See Peek 1960 and (especially for epigrams in 4th c.
BC) Tsagalis 2008, 135–160.
31
metics.36 The term is rarely used in the epitaphs
of men who grew older than the ephebic age.37
Beyond grave epigraphs,  σωφροσύνη was
often mentioned in honorific inscriptions.  The
ἕνεκα-sentences  justifying  public  approbation
granted to ephebes and their leaders are strik-
ingly  similar  to  those  we  can  see  in  earlier
epitaphs: they are crowned for their valour and
for  their  σωφροσύνη.38 As  the  Aristotelian
Athenaion Politeia  confirms, the leaders of the
ephebes are  called the  σωφρονιστής and the
κοσμητής, elected by members of each  phyle
from men over the age of forty.39 As the name
suggests, their principal duty was to make ephe-
36 Whitehead 1993, 71, cf. North 1960, 131. Epigrams
for women with σωφροσύνη in 4th c. BC: IG II² 5239,
6693a,  6858,  9057,  11162,  11169,  11974,  12924a,
13071, 13086; Peek, AG II 179; BCH 73 (1949) 527;
SEG 25:299, 42:212, 46:304. Epigrams for young men:
IG II²  5768,  6626,  6859,  11103;  SEG 13:223.  Metics
with σωφροσύνη are rare both in epitaphs (IG II² 8464),
and in honorific decrees (IG II2 145, 1186).
37 For exceptions, see IG II² 5452 (male citizen over 90
years), 13098 (male citizen over 70), and (perhaps) SEG
13:181 (age unspecified).
38 The sentence  “ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ  σωφροσύνης” is
found several times in Inscr. 8, 9, and 17 in Reinmuth
1971. The term σωφροσύνη is always accompanied by
ἀρετή  or  εὐσεβεία  in  honorific  inscriptions,  see
Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 223.
39 See [Aristot.]  Ath. 42.2–5, with Rhodes 1981, 502–
510. Aeschines claimed that those over forty are in “the
age  of  greatest  self-control”  (ἐν  τῇ  σωφρονεστάτῃ
αὑτοῦ ἡλικίᾳ ὤν, Aeschn. 1.11).
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bes decent (σωφρώνες) and orderly (κόσμιοι).
All  extant  ephebic  inscriptions  referring  to
σωφροσύνη are dated after Epicrates’  law (c.
335 BC), which reformed and institutionalized
traditional  ephebia,  i.e.  the military and patri-
otic training of the youth.40
The virtue of σωφροσύνη in the preserved
speeches of Attic orators is an important quality
of  the  good  citizen  who,  according  to  the
analysis of Adriaan Rademaker, features three
characteristics:
The σώφρων πολίτης as portrayed by the
Attic  orators  is  one  who  is  (i)  ‘decent’  in
social  interaction  and  sexual  matters,  and
‘moderate’  in  his  desires  and  expenses,  (ii)
‘just’ and law-abiding’ and not given to vio-
lence  and ὕβρις  against  his  fellow citizens,
and (iii) ‘quiet’ and ἀπράγμων to the point
of  ignorance  of  the  procedures  of  the  law
courts. As the juridical issues of cases vary,
σωφροσύνη  may  be  invoked  to  commend
any of these qualities,  or a combination of
them.41
Examining  the  above  characteristics  of  the
value-term  in  the  speeches  of  Aeschines,  we
can see that he often plays with the intellectual
40 For  the  traditional  ephebia  and  its  reform,  see
Faraguna 1992, 274–280; Liddel 2007, 290–293. 
41 Rademaker  2005,  234.  See also Dover  1974,  119–
123, and Roisman 2005, 176–185.
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and the moral facets of meaning, especially in
his  indictment  against  Timarchus.  The  super-
ficial interpretation may well be common sense
on the intellectual level, but every single occur-
rence of the term can be also comprehended in
a  deeper  layer  as  well,  where  the  underlying
meaning is moral self-control, or the mastering
of bodily desires. The nature of the case against
Timarchus,  an  alleged  former  male  prostitute
(πόρνος),42 enables him to play with the mean-
ing of the phrase, because σωφροσύνη repre-
sents  exactly  the  self-control  that  Timarchus
had  fallen  short  of  on  moral  and  intellectual
level  alike,  with  special  regards  to  his  sexual
behaviour. As, for example, Aeschines claims in
the exposition of the speech, Timarchus “was
free not to play a sycophantic prosecutor against
me, if he had any sense” (ἐμὲ δ’ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, εἰ
ἐσωφρόνει,  μὴ  συκοφαντεῖν,  Aeschn.  1.3).
Therefore the reason for the present trial is that
Timarchus had no sense at all – or rather that he
had  no  self-control  to  restrain  from  various
forms of debauched activities? Once Timarchus
is  framed  as  a  bad  citizen  who  committed
hybris even  against  his  own  body,43 and  who
presents grave danger to the σωφροσύνη of the
42 Since  Aeschines  provided  no  clear  evidence,  it  is
impossible to tell if the charges were true or false, but see
Fisher 2001, 53–67.
43 See Aeschn. 1.22, 108, 116, 185, 188. For the bad
citizen  frame  working  on  Timarchus,  see  Cook  2012,
223–226.
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youth,44 every occurrence of the value-term or
of its cognates can be (and perhaps should be)
understood on a moral level as well.45
Besides  σωφροσύνη,  Aeschines  also used
the  other  words of  decency (μετριότης,  κόσ-
μιος, and even πόρνος) for at least three dif-
ferent  purposes  in his orations.  First,  he took
advantage of these terms to reflect on his own
character (self-positioning), second, he defined
his  democratic  political  ideals,  and  third,  he
portrayed  his  enemies  as  deterrent  examples
because of their lack of decency.
3.1. DECENCY FOR SELF-POSITIONING
While  he  attacked Timarchus  for  speaking in
front  of  the  people  in  spite  of  his  immoral,
immoderate,  and  disorderly  way  of  life,  Aes-
chines obviously needed to portray himself  as
an  opposite  character:  moral,  moderate,  and
orderly. This ethos is carefully built with numer-
ous references to decency, starting in the very
first sentences of his indictment:
Never before, men of Athens, have I brought
an indictment against any man or persecuted
him at his final audit; no, I have in my opin-
44 Aeschines  repeatedly expresses his  concerns for the
youth, see Aeschn. 1.8–10, 22, 117, 121, 155, 191, 195,
and also Aeschn. 2.180. 3.245–246.
45 See e.g.  Aeschn.  1.123:  ἃ  μέλλω λέγειν  ἀκούσας
εἰσαῦθις οὐ χρήσῃ τοιούτῳ) are in fact far away from the values λόγῳ) are in fact far away from the values, ἐὰν σωφρονῇς; cf.
also Aeschn. 3.117, 242.
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ion demonstrated myself to be moderate in
all such matters. But since I could see that
the  city  was suffering serious damage from
this man Timarchus, etc.46
Aeschines claims himself a moderate (μέτριος)
person, because he has never indicted anyone,
that is, as Rademaker put it, he has always been
quiet and ἀπράγμων, but the harms Timarchus
has  done to  the  city  are  beyond  all  measure,
thus  Aeschines  had  no  choice  but  to  arraign
him.47 Nevertheless, he adds the remark in the
prologue  of  his  speech:  “I  hope  that  I  have
spoken  moderately  in  my  opening  words  on
this matter.” (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων  μετρίως
ἐλπίζω μοι προειρῆσθαι, Aeschn. 1.3.)48 Inter-
estingly,  the  structure  Aeschines  applied  to
reflect  on  his  own  moderation  in  the  first
sentence  (μέτριον  ἐμαυτὸν  … παρεσχηκώς)
was  used  against  him  by  Demosthenes  three
46 Aeschn.  1.1:  Οὐδένα  πώποτε  τῶν  πολιτῶν,  ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,  οὔτε γραφὴν γραψάμενος οὔτ’  ἐν
εὐθύναις  λυπήσας,  ἀλλ’  ὡς  ἔγωγε  νομίζω  μέτριον
ἐμαυτὸν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων παρεσχηκώς,  ὁρῶν
δὲ τήν τε πόλιν μεγάλα βλαπτομένην ὑπὸ Τιμάρχου…
47 Aeschines  promised  to  explain  clearly  how  he  had
become the victim of Timarchus’ malicious prosecution,
but  ultimately  he  did  not  return  to  this  question,  see
Fisher 2001, 121–122.
48 See also Aeschn. 1.39: ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.κέψασθε δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
ὡς μετρίως μέλλω προς φέρεσθαι  Τιμάρχῳ) are in fact far away from the values τουτῳ) are in fact far away from the valuesί,
and Aeschn. 3.9:  Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ὅλης κατηγορίας
μετρίως μοι ἐλπίζω προειρῆσθαι.
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years later in the trial on the Embassy (μέτριον
παρεῖχεν  ἑαυτόν),  when  he  described  how
modestly  Aeschines  had  conducted  himself
before  he  turned  into  an  evil  and  boastful
politician:
Before he caused the city every kind of harm,
he would admit  that  he was a public clerk
and owed you thanks for being elected to the
post, and he showed himself to be a mode-
rate person.49
But  Aeschines,  at  least  in  his  own  words,
continued  to  show  himself  a  self-restrained
citizen who has always lived a moderate life and
tried everything possible to protect good order
and decency in both private and public life.50 In
the  end  of  the  trial  on  the  Embassy,  while
begging the judges to acquit him of the charges,
he even referred back to the case of Timarchus
to underscore the importance of being σώφρων
and μέτριος:
49 Demosth.  19.314:  πρὸ  μὲν  τοῦ  πάντα  κάκ’
εἰργάσθαι τὴν πόλιν ὡμολόγει γεγραμματευκέναι καὶ
χάριν  ὑμῖν  ἔχειν  τοῦ  χειροτονηθῆναι,  καὶ  μέτριον
παρεῖχεν ἑαυτόν. (Modified translation of H. Yunis, see
Yunis 2005.) The same structure is found several times in
Demosthenes’  speech  against  Meidias,  see  Demosth.
21.128, 134, 186, 199.
50 To protect  his  own practice  in  erotic  relationships,
Aeschines  differentiated  between  decent  and  corrupted
love on the basis of the participants’ character, whether
they are σώφρονες or not, see Aeschn. 1.135–137.
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All of you who are fathers with sons or who
care  for  your  younger  brothers,  remember
that I have issued a call for decency that will
never be forgotten through my prosecution of
Timarchus.  And  as  to  all  the  rest  whom I
have never vexed with my conduct, an ordi-
nary man in fortune and as moderate as any
of you, and in political struggles the only one
of all of them who has not colluded against
you, I urge you to save me.51
Self-positioning with  the words of  decency is
also attested in Aeschines’ oration against Ctesi-
phon (330), where he anticipates Demosthenes’
criticism concerning his ἡσυχία, i.e. his retreat
from political activities in the past years. Aes-
chines claims that his quietness derives from the
μετριότης of his character:
My silence,  Demosthenes,  is  the  product  of
my restrained way of life. I am satisfied with
little  and have no desire for greater wealth
acquired shamefully; as a result, I both keep
51 Aeschn.  2.180–181:  ὅσοι  μὲν  ὑμῶν  πατέρες  εἰσὶ
παίδων ἢ νεωτέρους ἀδελφοὺς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθε,
ἀναμνησθέντες ὅτι  τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης παράκλη-
σιν διὰ  τῆς  περὶ  Τίμαρχον  κρίσεως  ἀειμνήστως
παρακέκληκα, τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἅπαντας, οἷς ἐμαυτὸν
ἄλυπον παρέσχημαι,  τὴν μὲν τύχην ἰδιώτης ὢν καὶ
τοῖς  μετρίοις ὑμῶν  ὅμοιος,  ἐν  δὲ  τοῖς  πολιτικοῖς
ἀγῶσι  μόνος  τῶν  ἄλλων  ἐφ’  ὑμᾶς  οὐ  συνεστηκώς,
αἰτῶ παρ’ ὑμῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν. See Paulsen 1999, 417.
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silent and speak with a set purpose, not under
the pressure of an extravagant nature.52
3.2. DECENCY AS POLITICAL IDEAL
The second purpose of using words of decency
is to set up a political ideal for all democrats. In
a very intriguing passage of the speech against
Ctesiphon, Aeschines defines the essentials for
an  individual  who  is  friend  of  the  people
(δημοτικός).53 He  warns  the  audience  not  to
trust the words of Demosthenes, lest they be de-
ceived; but rather they should concentrate their
attention on his character to see if it meets the
proper standard.
I shall reckon up together with you the quali-
ties a democrat and decent man should nat-
urally  possess,  and then  I  shall  set  against
them  the  character  to  be  expected  of  an
oligarch and a base man.54
52 Aeschn. 3.218: Τὴν δ’ ἐμὴν σιωπήν, ὦ Δημόσθενες,
ἡ τοῦ βίου μετριότης παρεσκεύασεν· ἀρκεῖ γάρ μοι
μικρά, καὶ μειζόνων αἰσχρῶς οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶ, ὥστε καὶ
σιγῶ καὶ λέγω βουλευσάμενος,  ἀλλ’  οὐκ ἀναγκαζό-
μενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δαπάνης.
53 Aeschn. 3.168–170.
54 Aeschn. 3.168: Ἐγὼ μὲν μεθ’ ὑμῶν λογιοῦμαι ἃ δεῖ
ὑπάρξαι ἐν τῇ φύσει  τῷ δημοτικῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ σώφ-
ρονι, καὶ ἀντιθήσω ποῖόν τινα εἰκός ἐστιν εἶναι τὸν
ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ φαῦλον.
39
As we see,  Aeschines openly contrasts  a man
(ἀνήρ) who is a democrat (δημοτικός) and has
self-restraint (σώφρων) with a person (ἄνθρω-
πος),  who  is  ὀλιγαρχικός  (oligarchic)  and
φαῦλος (base). The oppositions are telling: the
ideal  politician  is  not  merely  a  person  but  a
man;55 he friends with the people and not with
the few who try to rule them,56 and last, he is
not  base  but  decent.  He  does  not  need  to
explain  which  of  the  two  categories  Demos-
thenes belongs to.
The  list  of  conditions  that  make  a  man
δημοτικός  can  be  briefly  summarized  as
follows (Aeschn. 3.169–170): 1) free birth, 2)
his ancestors’ services to the city, 3) decent and
moderate disposition, 4) sound judgement and
ability to speak, and 5) courage. As for now, it
is  necessary  to  quote  the  third  point  in  full
length:
Third, he should show a  decent and mode-
rate  disposition in his  daily  life,  so  that  he
55 Aeschines rarely calls Demosthenes a man, but often
questions  his  virility  (Aeschn.  2.23,  148,  179,  3.155),
sometimes  even  calling  him  an  effeminate  κίναιδος
(Aeschn.  1.131,  181;  2.88,  99,  151),  see  Fisher  2001,
272–273,  Roisman 2005:  177,  and Matuszewski  2011,
124–135.
56 See  Aeschines’  theoretical  discussions  of  states,
Aeschn. 1.4–6, 3.6, 207, with Fisher 2001, 123–124.
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will not be led by excessive spending to take
bribes against the interests of the people.57
We could say that Aeschines merely repeats one
feature (being σώφρων) that he has mentioned
in the introduction of this passage, and thus his
third point is bombastic or tautologous: a decent
democrat must be decent and moderate. How-
ever, we can also underscore that he explicitly
connects two value-terms of decency (σωφρο-
σύνη and μετριότης) in this excerpt, which he
does not do frequently,58 even though the com-
bination of these phrases can be found already
in  Plato,59 in  Aristotle,60 and  in  some  of  the
orators as well.61 The point here is to highlight
the importance of decency as an essential ele-
ment in the  ethos of a democratic citizen, and
simultaneously,  to  deny  its  existence  in  the
character of his opponent: “Observe now which
of  these  qualities  Demosthenes  can  claim.”
(σκέψασθε  δὴ  τί  τούτων  ὑπάρχει  Δημοσ-
57 Aeschn. 3.170: Τρίτον  σώφρονα καὶ μέτριον χρὴ
πεφυκέναι  αὐτὸν  πρὸς  τὴν  καθ’  ἡμέραν  δίαιταν,
ὅπως μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν τῆς δαπάνης δωροδοκῇ
κατὰ τοῦ δήμου.
58 Cf. above Aeschn. 2.180–181.
59 E.g. Plat.  Rp 399b: σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως, cf.
560d.
60 E.g.  Aristot.  E.N. 1125b:  τὸν  δ’  ἀφιλότιμον  ὡς
μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα.
61 E.g. Isocr. 7.4, Demosth. 6.19, 21.128, 25.76–77, Pr.
43.
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θένει,  Aeschn.  3.170.)  As  we  are  told  here,
decency is  important for a δημοτικός man in
order to lead a simple and inexpensive way of
life,62 because excessive spending leads way to
bribery (δωροδοκία),  which is  another recur-
ring charge against Demosthenes.63
3.3. LACK OF DECENCY:
DETERRENT EXAMPLES
The  third  reason  for  utilizing  the  words  of
decency in the orations of Aeschines was to call
the audience’s  attention to  the dangers  of  the
lack  of  moderate,  orderly,  and  self-controlled
behaviour. What is going to happen to the city,
if  the  intrigues  and  pleas  of  certain  people
succeed to “prevent the moderate and habitual
way of justice?”64
62 Cf.  the  fancy  clothes  and  wealth  of  Demosthenes,
Aeschn. 1.131, and MacDowell 2009, 30–36.
63 Cf. e.g. Aeschn. 3,58, 69, 81, 94, 104–105, 129, 143,
149, 156, 209, 214, 221, 238–240, 244, 257, 259. As the
frequency  analysis  of  δῶρον and  its  cognates  revealed
(above),  Demosthenes iterated the charge of bribery in
the case of the Embassy (343), while Aeschines did the
same against his opponent in 330. For the contemporary
problems of gift-giving and bribery, see Mitchell 1997,
148–166.
64 Cf.  Aeschn.  3.1:  Τὴν  μὲν  παρασκευὴν  ὁρᾶτε,  ὦ
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν ὅση γεγένηται,
καὶ  τὰς  κατὰ  τὴν  ἀγορὰν  δεήσεις,  αἷς  κέχρηνταί
τινες ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ συνήθη μὴ γίγνεσθαι
ἐν τῇ πόλει.
42
If a man has shown  contempt for the laws
and  for  morality  on  the  most  important
issues, he has a certain attitude of mind that
is visible from his disorderly manner.65
Overlooking  or  despising  some  of  the  major
values, τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, is
characteristic  of  a  person  whose  habits  are
without proper order. His ἀκοσμία makes him
both repulsive and dangerous to law and order.
The combination of  σώφρων and κόσμιος is
also  attested  elsewhere  in  the  speeches  of
Aeschines (always in reference with the alleged
laws  of  Solon),66 and  it  is  rather  common in
contemporary literary sources as well.67 More-
over,  as  we could see in  the ephebic inscrip-
tions, these values are primarily expected from
young Athenians attending the ἐφηβία, as their
principal  leaders  were  named  accordingly
(σωφρονιστής and κοσμητής).
In the speech against  Timarchus,  the lack
of  σωφροσύνη  identifies  the  corruptive  be-
haviour of a ὑβριστής, i.e. a person committing
hybris. When Aeschines gives a definition of the
65 Aeschn.  1.189:  Ὁ  γὰρ  ἐπὶ  τῶν  μεγίστων  τοὺς
νόμους καὶ τὴν  σωφροσύνην ὑπεριδών,  ἔχει  τινὰ
ἕξιν  τῆς  ψυχῆς,  ἣ  διάδηλος  ἐκ  τῆς  ἀκοσμίας τοῦ
τρόπου γίγνεται. 
66 See Aeschn. 1.22, 3.2, 257.
67 E.g. Lys. 3.4, 14.41, 19.16, 21.19 (with commentary,
Kapellos  2013,  138–140);  Plat.  Phaed.  114e,  Alcib.
1.122c, Gorg. 508a, Leg. 802e;
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decent  and  the  indecent  types  of  love,  he
declares:
According to my definition, desire for those
who are noble and decent is characteristic of
the  generous  and  discerning  spirit,  but  de-
bauchery based on hiring someone for money
I consider characteristic of a wanton and un-
cultivated man.68
Still, ὕβρις with its cognates is only one of the
several negative terms that are used in reference
to the lack of  σωφροσύνη,  but not  the most
common one. The word πόρνος and its numer-
ous related forms are the strongest  phrases in
the oratory of Aeschines that allude to indecent
forms  of  behaviour.  Evidently,  most  occur-
rences  of  πόρνος  are  found  in  the  speech
against  Timarchus  (usually  the  defendant  is
named a πόρνος or is repeatedly said to have
prostituted himself, πεπορνευμένος),69 but the
formal target of the trial on the Crown, Ctesi-
phon  was  also  called  a  pimp (πορνοβοσκός)
twice.70 Though  the  reason  for  this  latter
68 Aeschn. 1.137: Ὁρίζομαι δ’ εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἐρᾶν τῶν
καλῶν καὶ  σωφρόνων φιλανθρώπου πάθος καὶ εὐ-
γνώμονος  ψυχῆς,  τὸ  δὲ  ἀσελγαίνειν  ἀργυρίου  τινὰ
μισθούμενον  ὑβριστοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου ἀνδρὸς ἔρ-
γον εἶναι.
69 Aeschn. 1.52, 70, 79, 94, 119, 130, 154, 159, 188,
189, cf. also Aeschn. 2.144.
70 Aeschn. 3.214 (πορνοβοσκία), 246 (πορνοβοσκός).
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naming  is  not  clear,  it  is  obviously  used  to
denigrate  Ctesiphon  by  linking  him  with  a
profession not  worthy of a σώφρων citizen.71
Demosthenes  himself  could  not  avoid  gaining
sobriquets  with  unsavoury  sexual  overtures,
either. Although he was never called a πόρνος,
Aeschines  sometimes  refers  to  him  with  his
childhood nickname Batalos,72 and his alleged
effeminacy was scourged by calling him a per-
vert catamite (κίναιδος).73 At one point, Aes-
chines  made  a  clear  and  even  ‘quantifiable’
contrast between σώφρονες (who are similar to
Aeschines’ brother-in-law, Philon) and κίναιδοι
(who are  exactly  like  Demosthenes),  claiming
that  the  former  ones  are  worth  at  least  three
times more than the latter:
71 Aristotle  calls  pimps  ἀνελευθέρους,  Aristot.  E.N.
1121b. See also Kapparis  1999, 229. We know hardly
anything for sure about Ctesiphon beside the fact that he
had  proposed  the  crown  for  Demosthenes,  see
MacDowell 2000, 211, cf. Carey 2001, 159–160.
72 Aeschn. 1.126, 131, 164, 2.99, the name is perhaps a
hint  to  Demosthenes’  bottoms.  (See  Schol.  in  Aeschn.
1.126: Βάταλος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐκαλεῖτο, καθότι μεγά-
λα καθίσματα εἶχεν. [273b] Βάταλον – καταπύγωνα
καὶ μαλακόν. [275]) Demosthenes referred to his name
as  Battalos  (perhaps  alluding  to  his  former  speech
impediment,  cf.  βατταρίζω),  Demosth.  18.180.  See
Lambin 1982.
73 Aeschn.  1.131,  181,  2.88,  99,  151,  cf.  also  3.167.
Demosthenes, in turn, called Aeschines a fox (κίναδος),
which  might  well  be  a  pun  for  κίναιδος,  see  Kamen
2014. For κιναιδία, see Dover 1989, 75–76, Matuszew-
ski 2011, 124–135.
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I am astonished that you have the nerve to
insult  Philon,  and  furthermore  among  the
most  upright  citizens  of  Athens,  who  have
come  here  to  give  judgement  in  the  best
interests of the city and are more concerned
with our way of life than with our speeches.
Do you think they would wish to have 10,000
infantrymen like Philon with bodies as fit as
his and minds as  decent, or 30,000 perverts
of your sort?74
* * *
As  we  can  see,  Aeschines  made  use  of  the
words referring to decency (or to its absence)
for three purposes. First, he wanted to produce
an image of himself in front of all the people of
Athens as a citizen who embodies the virtues of
σωφροσύνη, κοσμιότης, and μετριότης. Self-
positioning  himself  as  a  champion  of  these
values  seemed  an  obvious  strategy  against
Timarchus,  whose  reputation  as  a  prostitute
(whether true or false) evidently made him vul-
74 Aeschn.  2.150–151:  Ἐκπέπληγμαι  δέ,  εἰ  σὺ  λοι-
δορεῖν  Φίλωνα  τολμᾷς,  καὶ  ταῦτα  ἐν  τοῖς  ἐπι-
εικεστάτοις  Ἀθηναίων,  οἳ  δεῦρο  εἰσεληλύθασι
δικάσοντες  ἕνεκα  τοῦ  βελτίστου  τῆς  πόλεως,  καὶ
μᾶλλον  προσέχουσι  τοῖς  βίοις  ἡμῶν  ἢ  τοῖς  λόγοις.
Πότερα γὰρ ἂν προσδοκᾷς αὐτοὺς εὔξασθαι μυρίους
ὁπλίτας  ὁμοίους  Φίλωνι  γενέσθαι,  καὶ  τὰ  σώματα
οὕτω διακειμένους καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω σώφρονας, ἢ
τρισμυρίους κιναίδους οἵους περ σύ;
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nerable to moral charges. After the successful
prosecution of Timarchus, Aeschines may have
found it useful to keep the image of the σώφ-
ρων citizen, therefore he continued to reflect on
his own character accordingly in his subsequent
orations. Second, he consciously made decency
an essential character trait of the good politician
(ἀνὴρ δημοτικός) in his oration on the Crown.
This is remarkable, because this virtue had been
primarily  (though  not  exclusively)  praised  in
connection with women, young men, and for-
eigners, who were not typically excelling in the
political  arena.  And third, Aeschines used the
terms of decency to traduce his opponents by
displaying them as e.g. a πόρνος (Timarchus),
a  πορνόβοσκος  (Ctesiphon),  or  a  κίναιδος
(Demosthenes), all of them falling short of the
virtue of σωφροσύνη. All these uses made the
words of decency powerful value-terms in the
oratory of Aeschines.
However,  Demosthenes  was  probably  not
ignorant of the way Aeschines used these value-
terms in their political struggle. As it is obvious
from the frequency analysis,  Demosthenes did
rely  on  these  words  as  often  as  his  opponent
did,75 but there is a passage in his speech on the
Embassy  that  referred  back  to  the  trial  of
Timarchus, and thus it indicated his awareness
75 ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.ωφροσύνη (and cognates): Demosth. 18.215 (2x),
216, 19.196, 251, 285 (3x);  μετριότης (and cognates):
Demosth. 18.4, 10, 18, 102, 126, 256, 278, 321; κόσμιος
(and cognates): Demosth. 18.216, 287, 19.255 (2x).
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of  Aeschines’  endeavours  to  appropriate  the
position of decency:
Aeschines ruined Timarchus not, by Zeus, out
of concern for making your children’s char-
acter decent, for they already possess decent
character, Athenians, and may the city never
fare  so  badly  that  our  young  men  need
Aphobetus and Aeschines as their  guards of
decency…76 
On  the  one  hand,  calling  Aeschines  and  his
brother  Aphobetus  σωφρονισταί  may remind
us  of  the  elected  leaders  of  the  ephebes,  the
σωφρονιστής  and  the  κοσμητής,  who  were
mentioned  in  the  ephebic  inscriptions  of  the
330s  BC.77 On  the  other  hand,  the  sarcastic
remark of Demosthenes is perfectly designed to
demolish the image of the σώφρων citizen that
Aeschines has carefully constructed of himself,
since it ridicules him in the role he deliberately
tried  to  take  and  maintain.  He  made  great
efforts to gain a certain moral superiority over
76 Demosth.  19.285:  καὶ  τοῦτον  [Τίμαρχον]  ἀπώλε-
σεν,  οὐ  μὰ  Δί’  οὐχὶ  τῶν  ὑμετέρων  παίδων,  ὅπως
ἔσονται  σώφρονες,  προορῶν  (εἰσὶ  γάρ,  ὦ  ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι,  καὶ  νῦν  σώφρονες·  μὴ γὰρ οὕτω γένοιτο
κακῶς τῇ πόλει ὥστ’ Ἀφοβήτου καὶ Αἰσχίνου σωφρο-
νιστῶν δεηθῆναι τοὺς νεωτέρους)… 
77 See above.  The term σωφρονιστής was  commonly
used well before the Lycurgan ephebic reforms, see e.g.
Thuc. 6.87, Plat. R.P. 471a.
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his opponents in order to be able to define what
constituted  a  good  or  a  bad  citizen.  Though
σωφροσύνη is not the only virtue that makes
someone a good citizen according to Aeschines
(as we could see, several other value-terms were
at his hand), but it unique importance for him,
since it provided him with an eminent status to
make  difference  between  acceptable  or  unac-
ceptable  desires  and  actions,  and  ultimately
between good and bad citizens as well. That is
why  Aeschines  always  took  references  threat-
ening his moral higher ground very seriously.78
78 See  e.g.  Aeschn.  1.135  (on  his  love  affairs  in  the
palaestra), 2.4 and 153 (on the alleged drunken violence
against an Olynthian woman, cf. Demosth. 19.196–198);
and  3.216,  anticipating  Demosthenes’  attack  on  Aes-
chines for spending a lot of time with younger men in the
gymnasia. This latter attack, however, is not found in the
extant text of Demosth. 18.
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4. Comments on further value-terms
In this short  chapter we briefly survey further
values beyond decency that are used with great
frequency  in  the  orations  of  Aeschines.  All
value-terms would deserve a detailed analysis,
but here we are confined to highlight only some
of the major points.
4.1. COURAGE
The  overwhelming  number  of  references  to
words  of  courage  and  of  cowardice  seems to
confirm the point of Brad L. Cook, who main-
tains  that  a  key  element  of  Aeschines’  argu-
mentation  against  Demosthenes  in  the  Crown
speech  was  the  cowardly-deserter  frame.  De-
mosthenes  notoriously  escaped  the  battle  of
Chaeronea in 338 BC (along with thousands of
other Athenian citizens), but Aeschines expand-
ed  the  concept  of  cowardice  by  taking  great
pains to explain everything about Demosthenes
according  to  the  interpretation  framework  of
him as a coward.79
In  the  frequency  analysis  of  terms,  the
following  words  were  taken  into  account  (all
occurrences  in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch  are  given  in  paren-
theses): ἀνδραγαθία (5), ἀνδρεία (2), ἀρετή
(27),  θαρσύνω  (1),  θράσος  (5),  and  τόλμα
(40) as words of courage (RFI 1.5), and ἀνανδ-
79 See  Cook  2009  and  2012.  For  Demosthenes’
desertion, see Christ 2006, 134–142.
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ρία (10), δειλία (14), μαλακία (2) as words of
cowardice (RFI 5.4).
We need to remark that ἀρετή and ἀνδρα-
γαθία  are  terms  that  occur  frequently  in
honorific decrees of the period, and they do not
necessarily  mean  (battlefield)  courage  in  con-
temporary language, but rather virtue in general
(ἀρετή) and civic  excellence (ἀνδραγαθία).80
However, Aeschines consciously forced this tra-
ditional meaning in order to frame his opponent
as a coward.
Furthermore,  τόλμα and its cognates sub-
stantiate  an  audacious  and  daring  kind  of
courage, which is always considered negative in
the language of Aeschines, as e.g. Demosthenes
“had the nerve … to speak in praise of their
courage” (ἐτόλμησε … ἐγκωμιάζειν τὴν ἐκεί-
νων ἀρετήν. Aeschn. 3.152). Therefore, when-
ever his opponents are apparelled with a word
of courage, it already means the wrong sort of
courage.
4.2. EDUCATION
Aeschines  used  the  words  of  education  (παι-
δεία [8], παιδεύω [10]) and lack of education
(ἀπαιδευσία  [4],  ἀπαίδευτος  [6])  strikingly
80 See Whitehead 1993, 57–62, Cook 2009, 34–35. For
all  possible  combinations  of  ἀρετή,  ἀνδραγαθία,  and
other value-terms in public approbation, see Veligianni-
Terzi 1997, passim.
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often (RFI 3.6), especially compared to Demos-
thenes (who only used παιδεία [2], RFI 0.2).
Though Aeschines  came from a  relatively
humble  social  background,  and  it  is  unlikely
that he ever had a formal rhetorical training,81
he preferred to include an unusual  amount of
classical  poetry  (Homer,  Hesiod,  Euripides,
etc.)  into  all  his  speeches.82 In  the  oration
against Timarchus, Aeschines claims that one of
the generals speaking in defence of the accused
is soon going to cite a lot of poetry to make a
boast of his education (παιδεία) and to show
his  contempt  to  ordinary  citizens.  Therefore,
Aeschines says, “to show you that we have al-
ready acquired a little knowledge and learning,
we, too, shall say something on the subject” (ἵν’
εἰδῆτε ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς τι  ἤδη ἠκούσαμεν καὶ
ἐμάθομεν, λέξομέν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς περὶ τούτων.
Aeschn. 1.141). Here Aeschines identifies him-
self  (in  first  person  plural)  with  the  ordinary
people sitting in the audience, speaking in their
name against the elitist, swell-headed General.83
Curiously,  when  Demosthenes  does  men-
tion  παιδεία,  he  sneeringly  reflects  on  Aes-
81 Harris  1995,  28–29.  On  classical  Greek  education,
see Too 2001.
82 See Ford 1999.
83 For the relationship between the elite and the ordinary
people with regards to education, see Ober 1989, 156–
191. For the primacy of Athenian “popular  culture”  as
opposed to elite culture, and its role in the institutions,
see Canevaro 2017.
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chines’  fondness  of  the  term,  because  he  ap-
pealed to “understanding and education” (σύνε-
σιν  καὶ  παιδείαν,  Demosth.  18.127).  “And
what  gives  you  the  right  to  talk  about  edu-
cation?”  (ποῦ  δὲ  παιδείας  σοὶ  θέμις  μνησ-
θῆναι; Demosth. 18.128.)
4.3. DEMOCRACY
It  is  interesting  to  point  out  that  there  is  a
conspicuous  difference  between  Demosthenes
and  Aeschines  in  the  frequency  of  terms
referring  to  the  form  of  government  and  to
some of the basic institutions of the state.84 A
fundamental phrase is δῆμος and its adjective
δημόσιος. Leaving the obvious semantic varie-
gation aside (i.e. both words may have numer-
ous meanings), we can see that these terms are
much  more  prevalent  in  the  speeches  of
Aeschines  (209  occurrences,  RFI 3)  than  in
Demosthenes  (64  occurrences,  RFI 0.8).  We
need to add here that the noun δῆμος occurs 42
times in  the spurious  documents  of Demosth.
18, thus it is essential to work with the calib-
rated corpus, as described above in chapter 2.
What  is  even  more  surprising  is  that  the
term δημοκρατία, with 38 occurrences and an
outstanding  RFI (3.2)  in  ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Aesch,  is  almost
completely  absent  from  the  vocabulary  of
ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem  (RFI  0.07),  and  the  entire  corpus  of
genuine  Demosthenic  texts  contains  the  word
84 For the term in general, see Hansen 1991, 69–71.
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only 22 times. The only occasion we can find it
in ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem is when the speaker tells the curious
case  of  a  disenfranchised  Athenian  citizen,
Antiphon, who came back to the city to burn
the dockyards on the command of Philip II.85
However,  when  Demosthenes  arrested  him,
“that malicious Aeschines shouted and shrieked
that in a democracy it was intolerable for me to
assault hapless citizens…” (βοῶν ὁ βάσκανος
οὗτος  καὶ  κεκραγώς,  ὡς  ἐν  δημοκρατίᾳ
δεινὰ  ποιῶ  τοὺς  ἠτυχηκότας  τῶν  πολιτῶν
ὑβρίζων…  Demosth.  18.132.)  Demosthenes,
interestingly,  did  not  seem to  be  fond of  the
word ‘democracy’: the only time he used it  in
his  speeches  against  Aeschines  was  when  he
gave the phrase into the mouth of his opponent
in  oratio obliqua.  For Aeschines, on the other
hand,  δημοκρατία  was  a  frequently  used
political  value-term,  together  with  its  repre-
sentative  institution  (ἐκκλησία),  and  with  the
symbolic  centre  of  political  activity:  the
speakers’ platform (βῆμα).
4.4. LAW
The terms connected to the idea of law form
another  important  group of  political  concepts
for Aeschines. Respect for law is paramount in
all works of Attic orators, and the word νόμος
occurs in their entire corpus 1873 times. (This
figure is somewhat exaggerated, because it was
85 See Harris 1995, 121.
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impossible  to  calibrate  the  search  for  all
inflected forms of νόμος in the whole corpus of
orators,  therefore  the  result  also  includes
interjected references of the manuscripts indi-
cating that a legal text was to be read out during
the trial.) Considering the prevalence of νόμος
in  the  orators,  its  relative  frequency  in  the
speeches of Aeschines is remarkable (RFI 1.5),
especially  compared  to  that  of  Demosthenes
(RFI 0.44).
The  first  and  the  third  speeches  of  Aes-
chines  contain  most  of  the  occurrences  of
νόμος (183 out of 193), because a prosecutor
needed to stress the rule of law more often than
a defendant. Similarly, the cognates of giving a
law  (νομοθετέω,  RFI  4.8) and  trespassing the
law  (παρανομέω,  RFI  3.5)  are  much  more
common in the indictments: Aeschines quoted
and interpreted several laws in the introductory
section of  these speeches,  specifying the law-
giver’s  intentions  and insisting that  the  defen-
dant had transgressed every one of them, even
those that had very little to do with the actual
case on trial.86 This scrupulous legal reasoning
may have prevented the audience from noticing
that Aeschines had rather little hard evidence to
prove  his  case  against  Timarchus  and  Ctesi-
phon.87 At the same time, frequent repetition of
86 See e.g. Dover 1989, 27–28, 38–39.
87 Whether  the  legal  arguments  against  Ctesiphon’s
motion are well-founded or not is still a matter of debate
among scholars, see Harris 2017, 105–117.
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the words strengthened the image of the orator
as a competent and law-abiding politician.
According to the frequency analysis,  Aes-
chines  dominated  the  field  in  all  words  con-
nected  to  laws,  especially  with  νομοθέτης,
which is completely absent from the vocabulary
of ΣDem is conspicuous: 3863 words, i.e. 9%.Dem.88 However,  no explicit  reaction can
be  noticed  in  the  speeches  of  Demosthenes
concerning Aeschines’ preference for the terms
of law.
88 The term νομοθέτης and its cognates are often used
by  Demosthenes  in  his  oration  against  Timocrates
(Demosth. 24).
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5. Conclusion
Modern computer databases enable us to select,
measure, compare, and search various corpora
of ancient texts. Speeches of the Athenian ora-
tor Aeschines (Aeschn. 1–3) can be easily se-
lected  from  the  corpus  of  Attic  orators  and
compared to specific orations of Demosthenes
(Demosth. 18–19) both in size and in content.
The most commonly used phrases of Aeschines
need to be contrasted with the frequency of the
same terms within the corresponding speeches
of  Demosthenes,  and  also  within  the  entire
collection of orators. The resulting proportion is
called relative frequency index (RFI), which can
help us to find the most important key concepts
that Aeschines applied in his political struggles
against  his  opponents,  Timarchus,  Ctesiphon,
and most of all, Demosthenes.
Key concepts of Aeschines can be grouped
in thematic categories, the most fundamental of
which is  the group of  value-terms that  define
decent behaviour: σωφροσύνη, μετριότης, and
κοσμιότης.  Decency is  a principal  concept in
the oratory of Aeschines, since it is utilized for
three  different  purposes.  First,  value-terms
attached to decency are used by the speaker to
create  his  own  political  position  as  a  decent,
moderate,  and  orderly  citizen.  Second,  Aes-
chines  named  decency  as  one  of  the  five
important character traits that made somebody
57
a good politician (δημοτικὸς ἀνήρ). Third, he
tried to denigrate his opponents by showing how
they  fell  short  of  decency.  All  these  were
designed  to  secure  a  moral  high  ground  to
Aeschines,  however,  a  sarcastic  remark  of
Demosthenes  may  indicate  that  he  noticed
Aeschines’ endeavour to appropriate the role of
the decent citizen.
As  frequency  analysis  revealed,  there  are
numerous further key concepts in the speeches
of  Aeschines  that  he  used  significantly  more
often than his opponent, including value-terms
referring to the thematic categories of courage
(and  cowardice),  education,  democracy,  and
law. A detailed analysis of these categories re-
mains a desideratum.
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